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Making Sense of the
Asian Success Story:
An Integrative Framework
Chow-Hou Wee and Gilbert Tan
INTRODUCTION
Asia has a humble origin. Just after the Second World War, the Asian
population was considered as one of the poorest in the world. Every
indicator of economic and social development showed that the Asian
countries were far behind Latin American countries. In 1950, it was
estimated that the real per capita GNP of Japan was US$251. South
Korea and Taiwan were among the poorest with less than US$100
real per capital GNP. Hong Kong and Singapore were relatively bet-
ter off. Their real per capita GNP were about US$200 and US$400
respectively (Tan, 1992).
At that time, many development economists expected that Asia
countries would face difficulties in growth and development due to
their large population base and small domestic market in terms of
purcbasing power. Worse still, the Asian population was growing
rapidly. In contrast, Asia is now considered as tbe fastest growing re-
gion of tbe world. In tbe past 35 years, Taiwan's GDP grew 19 times;
Singapore and Soutb Korea increased by 17 times; and Hong Kong by
12 times. As for Japan, its GDP doubled witbin eight years between
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1960 and 1968, and it doubled again in the next 14 years (Lee, 1996).
If GDP is not a good measure of overall development, there are other
indices like the Human Developement Index (HDI) that give global
indication of socioeconomic development. Empirical findings of these
indices also confirmed the outstanding performance of the Asian
economies (Starker and Gaur, 1994).
These growth patterns are in marked contrast to the increasing
problems faced by many developed nations in sustaining sufficient
economic grovi^ th. The djmamic growth of Asian countries has defied
the expectations of development economists even though a few of
them may question the sustainability of Asia's growth phenomenon
(Kinigman, 1994). In fact, the development economists are so im-
pressed by Asia's success that they even call the growth phenomenon
a "miracle" (WoronofF, 1986; Lall, 1994a; Page, 1994).
Given the spectacular development of Asia, it is not surprising that
Asian economies have become a subject of interest by both policy-
makers and scholars. For instance, recently, the World Bank
identified eight High Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs) and com-
pleted a study on them.^ These eight HPAEs are Japan, the "four
tigers"—Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan—
and the three newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of Southeast
Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Page, 1994). The conclu-
sion of the World Bank study mainly confirmed the importance of
savings, investment in education, and sound macroeconomics in the
high performance of the Asian economies.
Contrary to perceptions of some Westerners, Asia is not homoge-
neous. It is made of countries with varying cultural, historical, and
political heritage. The economic developmental experiences of these
countries are also diverse. Broadly, Asia can be grouped into the
"needy" and "speedy" parts. The growth rate over the past 30-40
years for the "needy" part was about 3 to 3.5%, whereas the "speedy"
part experienced a growth rate of 7 percent to 10 percent (Patel,
1994). Since we are interested in the success story of Asia, the focus
of this article will he on those Asitin countries that have experienced
spectacular growth over the past 50 years. We will concentrate on the
five most successful Asian countries, namely Hong Kong, Japan, Sin-
gapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Specifically, we will provide an in-
tegrative framework to explain the success story of these countries.
Admittedly, many ideas expressed in this framework will not be orig-
inal since so much work have been done in this topic and almost every
plausible explanations of Asia's success has been explored. Our
'The study is documented in varios background papers on "The East Asian Miricle" by the Pol-
icy Reasearch Department, World Bank, Washington D.C.
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unique contribution to the literature lies in our effort to synthesize
the thoughts expressed by scholars and policy-makers into a coherent
framework that accounts for the dynamic developmental experiences
of the five Asian countries.
THE MANY STORIES OF ASIAN SUCCESS
The debate on why Asia is so successful is still very much alive.
Scholars and policy-makers use various approaches and perspectives
to explain the Asian success story. One approach is to concentrate on
in-depth analysis of individual Asian country (Amsden, 1979; 1989;
Lee, 1973). Another approach is to examine Asian countries as ag-
gregated wholes, for example, the "four dragons" of Asia, ASEAN, or
East Asia (Huges, 1995; Tan, 1996; Woronoff, 1986). Still another ap-
proach is to conduct comparative analyses of Asian countries (Tan,
1992). Likewise, there are many interpretations on Asia's spectacu-
lar growth phenomenon depending on one's theoretical perspective.
The advantage of having diverse approaches and theoretical per-
spectives is that they will enrich our understanding of Asia's eco-
nomic performance. The disadvantage is that it can also lead to dis-
agreement and confusion when scholars and policy-makers become
dogmatic in their own approaches and perspectives.
One common theme among the various theories of Asia's develop-
ment process is the attribution of a single-cause to explain the spec-
tacular growth. These single-cause theories range from the tradi-
tional economic school of thought—neo-classical orthodoxy
(Hopkinson, 1993; World Bank, 1993) to the interventionist school
(Perkins, 1994), and from the technological imperative (Amsden,
1989; Kraemer and Dedrick, 1994) to the important role of culture
(Dore 1987; Han, 1988).
Neo-classical Orthodoxy
The main argument of the neo-classical orthodoxy is based on the
importance of "getting the prices right" to achieve economic growth.
Assuming perfect market conditions exist, the neo-classicists believe
that the market mechanism provides the essential framework for the
country to allocate resources efficiently for productive outputs. Thus,
they would advocate free trade of goods and services, export-orient-
ed programs, free flow of capital investment, technology and man-
agement know-how, flexibility in the labor market, and freedom from
excessive control by the government as recipes for economic growth.
Among the successful Asian countries, it is generally agreed that
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Hong Kong's developmental experiences come closest to the neo-clas-
sical model (Woronoff, 1986). It is well documented tbat Hong Kong's
government exerts minimal interferences in tbe economy. Tbe Hong
Kong government mainly confines itself to investment in infrastruc-
ture, spatial planning, bealtb and safety regulation, and tbe gatber-
ing of statistics for private and public sector consumption (Huges,
1995).
Recently, there is a softening of stand by neo-classicists with re-
gards to tbe role of the state in economic development. Traditional-
ly, tbey would argue tbat tbe state sbould only confine itself to cre-
ating a conducive economic environment for economic actors,
bousebolds and entrepreneurs to operate. Examples of acceptable
state interventions according to tbe neo-classicists are maintaining
law and order, providing industrial, domestic and international
peace, and intervening in areas of market failures sucb as natural
monopolies (Riedel, 1988). Perbaps due to tbe experiences of tbe
Asian economies, tbe more liberal neo-classicists would agree tbat
tbe state could use "market-friendly" approacbes to stimulate tbe
economic growth. Briefly, tbe principles of "market friendly" ap-
proacbes specify that tbey should be applied reluctantly (i.e., wben
tbe intervention is superior to market operation), cautiously (i.e.,
subject the intervention to tbe discipline of domestic and interna-
tional markets), and openly (i.e., tbe intervention should be simple,
transparent and not arbitrary) (World Bank, 1991).
Interventionist School
The neo-classical ortbodoxy is based on tbe assumptions of perfect
market conditions, sucb as, perfect information, factor mobility witb-
in tbe country, and freedom from dominance by a few active economic
actors as in the case of monopoly or oligopoly. Given sucb assump-
tions, tbe neo-classicists believe that tbe market mecbanism would
be tbe most effective and efficient means to allocate resources for
economic growtb. However, there are economists wbo cballenge tbis
view. Tbese economists, argue tbat market failures are pervasive,
tbus tbe state needs to intervene. The tbeoretical roots of tbis op-
posing school can be traced to tbe structuralist development tbeory
in tbe 1950s and 1960s (Arndt, 1985; Onis, 1995).
Tbe practical examples of tbe interventionist approach can be
found in tbe developmental experiences of Japan and Singapore.
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and
Singapore's Economic Development Board (EDB) are well known for
tbeir active role in tbe early development of tbeir countries. After tbe
postwar period, MITI was responsible for formulating tbe industrial
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policy of Japan, whereas EDB was tasked to promote foreign in-
vestment in Singapore to support its industrial program.
Proponents of the state-intervention school argue that the source
of market failure is not due to policy and intervention distortions.
Instead, market failures are the result of monopolistic behaviour in
the economy. Other sources of market failure include lack of local en-
trepreneurship and technological know-how, and the irresponsible
actions of middle-men and money-lenders who increase the opera-
tion cost of small businesses. Recently, Lall (1994a) observes that the
invisible hand of the market "may not give correct signals to resource
allocation between first, simple and difficult activities, and, second,
between physical investments, technology purchase and internal
technological effort" (648). In other words, if left to the market mech-
anism, too few resources would be channeled to difficult activities
and endogenous research and development (R&D) investment.
Anyone familiar with the literature on Asian development cannot
deny the active role played by the state. There is abundant support
for the state-intervention school of thought in the Asian context
(Amsden, 1979, 1989; Johnson, 1986; and Wade, 1990). Kwon (1994)
even went to the extent of concluding that "the manner in which they
(East Asians) organized and executed their development was unique-
ly East Asian, with the government playing a key role in almost
every aspect of the endeavour" (635).
Technological Imperative
Supporters of the technological imperative believe tbat investment
in technology can play a crucial role in stimulating economic growth
and development. Theoretically, the technology imperative can be
traced to the "technological ladder" hypothesis of economic develop-
ment (Kaplinsky, 1984; Tan, 1992). Figure 1 gives the graphical rep-
resentation of the hypothesis. Essentially, the "technological ladder"
hypothesis predicts that as countries progress, they move from low
technology products such as primary products to high technology, in-
formation-based products. Griffith uses the analogy of a relay race:
"the first tier of manufacturing developing countries to start (indus-
trialising), passes the baton to the second tier, and then limps be-
hind" (Griffith, 1987: 67).
The Proton Saga project is a good illustration of the "technologi-
cal ladder" hypothesis. In 1985, Japan's Mitsubishi Motor Corpora-
tion Limited transferred its technology in car manufacturing to
Malaysia through a joint-venture. Since then Malaysia has pro-
gressed steadily in upgrading its car manufacturing processes and
has its own research and development centre to cater to the needs
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Figure 1. The Technological Ladder Hypothesis
Source: Adapted from Tan (1992: 62).
of the Asian markets. About a decade later, Malaysia is ready to help
transfer the technology on car assembly to Vietnam. In March 1995,
a joint venture project by Malaysia's Proton, Japan's Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corporation and Vietnam's Vietranscimex would commence op-
erations on vehicle assembly in southern Ho Chi Minh City (South
China Morning Post, 1994).
In the economic literature, it is well documented that the Asian
countries have actively sought to acquire technology to stimulate
progress in their economies (Pack, 1993). For example, Japan and
South Korea were actively involved in helping their infant industries
to get acquire technology through capital good imports, invention
and encouraging industries to be competitive (Hopkinson, 1993).
Hong Kong and Singapore rely on their open-door policies to attract
foreign direct investment to bring in the needed technology. In con-
trast, Taiwan restricted foreign direct investment but rely on other
means, for example licences to acquire foreign technology.
The Important Role of Culture
Economists have been criticised for ignoring the role of non-econom-
ic factors, such as, national culture, in contributing to economic suc-
cess in the Asian countries. There is intuitive appeal that culture can
somehow influence economic performance of a country. This is be-
cause culture influences how individuals feel, think and act. Thus,
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cultural values such as thrift, diligence, respect for education, will
help develop a competitive work-force to support and drive econom-
ic development. Theoretically, the idea of linking culture and eco-
nomic success can be traced to the work of Weber (1958) who argued
that the Protestant work ethics had contributed to the rise of capi-
talism in Western Europe. Likewise, McCelland (1961) demonstrat-
ed that it could encourage the development of entrepreneurs to sup-
port economic development by inculcating the right attitudes (need
for achievement) among the people of a society. The cultural imper-
ative has, therefore, a rich theoretical foundation.
Looking at the Asian context, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South
Korea, and Singapore all share the common cultural heritage of Con-
fucianism. Hence, there are some scholars who believe that there is
a linkage between Confucianism and economic growth (Dore, 1987).
These scholars would argue that Confucianism promotes values that
are conducive for economic development. For example, the teaching
on harmonious relationships, loyalty, and respect for authority ex-
plains why management and labour in Asian countries could work
closely together and peacefully in pursuit of national goals (Tai,
1989; Tan, 1992). Likewise the teaching on diligence and respect for
learning explains why the Asian labor-force is well trained, disci-
plined, and hard-working (Lim, 1994; Chen, 1985).
We have briefly reviewed four major schools of thoughts relevant
to the developmental success of the five Asian countries. It is not the
intention of this article to critique these theories or to resolve their
differences. Proponents of each theory are able to cite evidence to
support their arguments. Yet, their opponents are able to cite
counter-evidence. The most obvious lesson from this brief review is
that while each school of thought is not entirely wrong, it is never
fully right. Each school of thought has its strengths and weaknesses,
and it can only partially explain the Asia success story. The conser-
vative neo-classicists underestimates the importance of state inter-
vention, whereas the extreme Interventionists totally ignore market
fundamentals. Likewise, neither technology nor culture alone could
be sufficient to drive economy growth and development. In the next
section, we will try to offer an integrated framework to explain the
Asian success.
AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK
Overview
As noted earlier, there is more than one success story regarding the
developmental experiences of the five Asian "miracle" economies. We
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Figure 2. An Integrative Framework To Explain the Asian Success Story
know that each Asian country took a different route to success and
pursued its own unique economic objectives (Woronoff, 1986). Yet,
the challenge is to come out with a framework that can link these
success stories into a coherent whole. Figure 2 gives a graphical il-
lustration of such a framework. Our framework contributes to the
literature in that, unlike previous studies which tend to be disci-
pline-bound, our framework captures the research efforts of diverse
field of studies ranging from economics to strategic management and
sociology.
Briefly, the framework indicates that the strategic choices of the
government, natural endowment of the country, and other non-eco-
nomic factors will directly affect the quantity and quality of a coun-
try's resource base. The elements of a country's resource base are hu-
man resources, infrastructure, natural resources, technology, and
capital. The accumulation and deployment of these resources will di-
rectly affect the country's competitive and comparative advantages,
which, in turn, determine its economic performance. The framework
also shows that strategic choices will directly affect competitive ad-
vantages, whereas, natural endowment will directly affect compara-
tive advantage of the country. The arrows linking non-economic fac-
tors to strategic choices and natural endowment suggest that
non-economic factors can affect these two factors. The dotted lines
joining economic performance to strategic choices and factor endow-
ment are feedback loops.
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Strategic Choices and Factor Endowment
The five successful Asian countries as reviewed in this integrative
framework commenced their development journey with varying
starting positions. Each country is endowed differently in terms of
resources, population characteristics, infrastructure, and geographi-
cal advantages, etc. Among them, Japan was the first to be indus-
trialized and soon the other four began to pattern after the early suc-
cess of Japan. Given the diversity in factor endowment among the
five Asian countries, the mix of strategic choices available to each of
them varies widely. Hence, it is not surprising that they each has
chosen a different path to success.
Broadly conceived, strategic choices are policy options decided and
implemented by the state to promote economic welfare. The tools
available to the state implementing their strategies are many. For
instance, the state can vary deposit and borrowing rates, impose im-
port and export quotas, provide subsidies or tax incentives to select-
ed industries, engage in direct investments, develop export-market-
ing institutions, establish avenues to share information between
public and private sectors, etc. (Page, 1994).
In addition, there is also a wide variety of policy options available
to the state in formulating their developmental strategies. At one ex-
treme, the state can choose to adopt the neo-classical framework
which emphasises the invisible hands of free market, and at the oth-
er extreme is the interventionist framework which emphasises gov-
ernmental actions. In choosing the interventionist framework, there
are two kinds of intervention—functional and selective (Lall, 1994b).
Fundamental interventions are those that address the problem of
market failure without favoring any industry or activity in particu-
lar. Examples of fundamental interventions are investing in human
capital, ensuring macroeconomic stability, limiting price distortions,
and encouraging transfer of foreign technology. Selective interven-
tions are those that favour a particular industry or activities. In-
struments for selected interventions include mild financial repres-
sion, selective industrial promotion programmes, and export-push
policies.
With the exception of Hong Kong, the economic success of the
Asian countries has been attributed to the interventionist frame-
work. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
has played an important role in her post-war industrialization pro-
gram (Johnson, 1982). Likewise, a good account of how the state in-
tervenes in Taiwan's, South Korea's and Singapore's economies can
be found in Amsden (1989), Gold (1986) and Lim (1983), respective-
ly. Only Hong Kong comes close to implementing the neo-classical
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framework (Woronoff, 1986). Even there, Amsden (1994) observes
that Hong Kong's textile industry has been strongly protected by di-
rect state intervention. This is in agreement with Ho and Lin's
(1991) observation that Hong Kong has moved more towards the in-
terventionist framework to protect her textile industry.
The arrow in the figure connecting strategic choices to resource
base shows that they are related. Essentially, strategic choices can
affect the country's resource base in various ways, namely, accumu-
lation, allocation, and technology catch-up (Page and Petri, 1993).
Experience shows that the five successful Asian countries have made
appropriate decisions on how to accumulate and deploy resources
and how to acquire technology for their economic programmes.
(Please refer to the section on Resource Base).
Export-orientation is one strategy that is most associated with the
success of the five Asian countries (Pack and Page, 1993). Although,
the five successful Asian countries had always been commended for
adopting export-oriented strategies, in retrospect, all of them were in
some ways compelled into adopting this strategy. At the early stage
of development, they were resource-poor and since they had small do-
mestic markets in terms of purchasing power, they could not rely on
import-substitution industries to support their economy. The only op-
tion available to them was to engage in export-oriented activities to
earn foreign exchange for importing food and raw materials.
The export-oriented strategy helped the five Asian countries in
many ways. The ensuring growth of employment enabled the coun-
try to save and accumulate capital for reinvestment. The export-ori-
ented strategy also positively affects the competitive advantages of
the country. Export-orientation expanded the markets for the local
firms; this enabled them to harness economies of scale and advan-
tages of specialisation. The pressures of directly competing with for-
eign firms also kept the firms on their toes. To survive, they had to
continually improve on quality and control cost. Besides bringing in
the needed foreign exchange for their imports, the export-oriented
strategy also encouraged the local firms to upgrade themselves tech-
nologically which in turn helped the country to industrialise.
Non-Economic Factors
It is undeniable that appropriate strategic choices made by the state
have contributed to the success of Asia. Yet, we must not forget that
there are other non-economic factors, such as culture, the need to sur-
vive, strong government, historical factors (for example, the role of
imperialism), and even luck, that could have helped in the develop-
ment process of these countries. These factors could indirectly affect
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the competitive and comparative advantages of the country through
their impact on strategic choices, factor endowment, and resource. We
can easily conceive how non-economic factors can influence strategic
choices. For example, the success in applying interventionist frame-
work will depend on having a strong and uncorrupted government.
Likewise, having a strong and uncorrupted government will foster
confidence among foreign investors leading them to invest in the
coimtry and bring in the needed capital and technology for develop-
ment. Non-economic factors can also directly influence the resource
base. For example, natural disasters such as famines and earth-
quakes can deplete the country's resources overnight. In the case of
Singapore, unlike other Asian countries such as India and China, the
fact that it has not been plagued with any natural disasters does help
to account for its uninterrupted dynamic growth.
Need For Survival. We have already discussed bow culture, and in
our case, Confucianism, can contribute to economic progress. Siege
mentality or the need for survival is one behavioural factor that is
commonly associated with Asia's success (Grabowski, 1994; Tan,
1992). The experiences of the Second World War and Cold War bave
bad profound influences on the people of Japan, Taiwan, and South
Korea. During that time, there was so much uncertainties about
their future. The humiliation of being defeated in Second World War
became a source of motivation for the Japanese to succeed economi-
cally. In the case of South Korea and Taiwan, they were also faced
with the real possibility of being invaded by their neighbours. These
threats kept the Korean and Taiwanese on tbeir toes motivating
them to work hard for their survival. Even Singapore and Hong
Kong faced some threats to their survival. In the 1960s, after the
separation from the Federation of Malaysia, Singapore had to face
the uncertainty of its viability as an independent state. As for Hong
Kong, the flood of refugees from China in the 1950s and 1960s had
caused intense competition for personal survival among its people.
Strong Government When groups encounter external threats,
they tend to be more cohesive. This is perhaps another reason why
Asians are willing to put aside their personal interests in pursuit of
national goals and even be willing to submit to strong, authoritari-
an governments (Migdal, 1986). South Korea and Taiwan have been
subjected to military dictatorships for a long time. Singapore has
been effectively governed by one pohtical party since its indepen-
dence. Generally, there has been no change of governments in the
five successive Asian countries since the Second World War (Tan,
1992).
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Having a strong government has its advantages. Since develop-
ment is a long-term process, it requires the citizens to make short-
run sacrifices in the interest of the future. A strong and active gov-
ernment is able to maintain internal stability to push through
unpopular policies that will benefit the country in the long-run (Pa-
tel, 1994). Also, a strong government can overcome obstacles posed
by sectional interest groups, and thus is better able to implement
tough, corrective policies for the long-term benefits of the country
(Grifiith, 1987). In addition, as can be testified by the Singapore ex-
perience, a strong government is essential to instill the confidence of
foreign investors to invest in the country. In the early 1960s, when
the People's Action Party came into power, there were political un-
certainties in Singapore which led to the withdrawal of capital by
some foreign firms in Singapore. However, the trend quickly re-
versed itself when there were encouraging signs that the People's Ac-
tion Party, under the leadership of Mr Lee Kwan Yew, could provide
a strong government for Singapore.
Historical Factors. Some scholars acknowledge the role that im-
perialism played in the developmental process of the Asian countries
(Patel, 1994; Tan, 1992). Korea and Taiwan were colonies of Japan
under the end of Second World War. Likewise, Singapore was colo-
nized by the British until she gained independence in the 1960s, and
Hong Kong is still a colony of the British until 1997. Experiences had
shown that the colonial masters did help their colonies to develop by
establishing the basic infi*astructure and foundations for economic
development. Hong Kong and Singapore inherited an efficient civil
service from the British which help to implement the countries de-
velopmental programmes. In addition, the British have established
in both countries good communications, transport and education sys-
tems to support their development efforts.
Japan modernised and developed Taiwan's and Korea's agricul-
tural industry when they were under its rule. It introduced new
farming techniques and improved their irrigation systems. Like the
British, Japan had also improved the health and education systems
and helped develop the communications and transport systems of its
colonies. Thus, the basic foundations were already laid out by Japan
when these two countries embark on their export-oriented industri-
alization programs in the 1960s (Tan, 1992; Wu, 1987).
Developing At the Right Time. The search for reasons for Asian's
success went beyond traditional fields of studies, such as, economics
and sociology. Some scholars even attributed the Asian success to
pure luck (Patel, 1994; Tan 1992). In retrospect, the Asian countries
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were fortunate to be developing at the right time. Firstly, during that
period, the anti-communist sentiments were strongest. This opened
up opportunities for developing nations to obtain generous aids from
anti-communist nations. Secondly, there was certain technology
breakthroughs that the Asian countries were able to harness; and,
thirdly, world trade was growing quickly.
In the 1950s and 1960s, there was full support for economic re-
covery and development by developed, anti-communist nations, such
as. United States and Britain (Wornoff, 1966). Japan was ruined af-
ter the Second World War. Yet, fortune was with Japan when sud-
denly the communist threats became stronger in Asia after the Chi-
nese Communist Party took over China and North Korea attacked
South Korea. These events caused United States to decide to help
Japan re-industrialise by transferring technology, injecting capital
and opening its markets for Japanese exports (Lee, 1996). The mas-
sive foreign aid from United States and other anti-communist coun-
tries have also helped South Korea and Taiwan in their economic
development. To some extent. Hong Kong, and Singapore have ben-
efitted from British aid (Woronoff, 1986). The anti-communist sen-
timent have also prompted the World Bank and International
Development Associate to offer extensive loans to the Asian countries
to assist them in their development programs.
Tan (1992) noted that the five Asian countries were lucky to be de-
veloping at the time when they could take advantage of certain
breakthroughs in transport and communications and manufacturing
technology. The development of container technology lowered the
transport cost of exported goods. The Asian countries were amongst
the first to exploit this new technology. The development of satellite
communications also made it easier for multi-national corporations
to control their subsidiaries in foreign countries. This has had a posi-
tive impact on foreign investment in the Asian countries. Another
technological breakthrough that benefitted the Asian countries was
miniaturisation. This new technology made it cost-effective for mul-
ti-national corporations to manufacture electronic products in the
Asian countries and then re-export them back to their home coun-
tries.
The five Asian countries were also lucky in that they were indus-
trializing at the right time when world trade was rising. This helped
the Asian countries very much when they were embarking on their
export-oriented programs. They had no problems exporting their
goods to the more advanced countries, especially, the United States
and Western Europe. These countries just opened their markets to
Asia's manufactured goods (Tan, 1992).
In sum, while there may be an element of truth that the five Asian
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economies may be lucky to be developing at the right time, in final
analysis, what makes them to be more successful than others is that
they were proactive and managed to take prompt action to benefit
from the windows of opportunities before others.
The Advantages of "Neo-Development"
Another factor of success attributed by Woronoff (1986) is what he
called the "age of neo-development". In gist, there are certain ad-
vantages that the Asian countries could exploit being a latecomer in
economic development. Earlier successes of other advanced coun-
tries could be a source of inspiration to the Asian countries and they
could serve as models for the Asian countries to pattern after. The
Asia's development follows a "fiying geese" pattern with Japan lead-
ing the fiock. The "four tigers"—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and Singapore—were the closest followers and benefitted much
from the Japanese experiences. Now, the other countries in Asia are
learning from the "four tigers." Since the 1980s, the ASEAN coun-
tries like Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia have opened up their
economies and promoted foreign investment. In the 1990s, India,
Vietnam, and other closed economies in South East Asia are begin-
ning to open their economies to promote growth. Being late-comers,
the Asian countries had more ready access to technology, capital and
market from developed countries. Technological advancement is a
tedious process. However, the Asian countries need not reinvent the
wheel and invest resources on endogenous R & D . They could ac-
quire technology cheaper and easier by encouraging foreign invest-
ment. Alternatively, the Asian countries send their students over-
seas to learn from the more advanced countries. In sum, Asia's pace
of development was speeded up, thanks to the advantages of being
latecomers.
Resource Base
Our framework indicates that strategic choices, non-economic fac-
tors, and factor endowment influence the resource base of Asian
countries, which, in turn, affect the country's competitive and com-
parative advantages. According to our framework, human resources,
capital, technology, infrastructure and natural resources constitute
the essential resource base for a country's economic activities.
Natural and Human Resources. The Asian countries were not
richly endowed with natural resources. The only resource that they
could rely on to develop their economies were human resources. Just
around the time when the Asian countries were starting their de-
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velopment programs, Nobel Prize winner. Professor Schultz, had al-
ready established the link between education and economic growth
(Schultz, 1960, 1961). According to Schultz, activities on human capi-
tal investment include formal education at the primary, secondary,
and higher levels; informal/on-the-job training; study programs for
adults; public health programs; migration programs to meet the de-
mands of changing job opportunities.
In hindsight, the Asian countries followed quite closely Schultz's
prescriptions for human resources investment. The quality of school-
ing in Asian countries has improved tremendously over the years,
compared to other middle-income economies (Page, 1994). Invest-
ment on basic education had expanded over the years. For example,
Taiwan had only four universities and four junior college in 1952. By
1989, the number of educational institutions increased to 42 univer-
sities and 75 polytechnics or colleges (Goh, 1993). It is common to
see schools in Asia operating on two shifts during the day and oper-
ating at night for adult education (Huges, 1995). Overall, there is a
bias towards vocational and technical education as opposed to gen-
eral education (Lim, 1991). The Asian countries tend to be pragmat-
ic in their education policies. They focus on disciplines that help to
create economic values for the society. As noted by the Senior Min-
ister of Singapore, Mr Lee Kwan Yew, East Asia needs a solid base
of engineers and scientists to support its economic development pro-
grams. Hence, the education systems tend to emphasize hard disci-
pline such as Mathematics, Sciences, and Engineering (Straits
Times, 1996). Besides upgrading the educational standard of their
nations, the Asian countries also upgraded the skills of their work-
ers through promotion of enterprise training programmes, including
many sponsored by the government (Page, 1994). To build a healthy
and productive workforce, the Asian countries have comprehensive
public health programmes, ranging from inoculation and vaccination
to provision of pure water and waste disposal (Huges, 1995).
Capital, Technology, and Infrastructure. The developmental
history of the Asian countries testifies that the economic perfor-
mance of a country depends on its ability to acquire capital, tech-
nology and infrastructure. The Asiein countries managed to increase
savings and plough them into infrastructural development invest-
ment and technological upgrading. As shown in Table 1, over the
past 30 years, on average, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South
Korea saved and invested 30.6 percent of its GDP. For Japan, it was
33.7 percent. In comparison, the US saved and invested only 18.4
percent and Europe only 22.5 percent of their GDP (Lee, 1996).
Besides savings, another source of capital and technology is
through foreign investment. In the 1980, foreign investment in the
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Table 1. Saving Rates in United States and the Five Asian Countries
(% of GDP)
Country 1966-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-94 1966-94
United States
Japan
Four NIEs:
Singapore
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Korea
20.0
36.3
17.6
24.0
22.9
17.9
20.1
35.2
27.8
30.8
31.2
22.3
17.8
31.6
40.3
33.4
33.6
30.4
15.4
32.9
46.5
34.3
28.2
36.4
18.4
33.7
34.0
31.4
30.3
26.9
Sources: Straits limes, June 18, 1996: 26.
East Asia countries amounted to $1.36 billion. By 1995, the amount
increased to $36.5 billion (Beijing Review, 1996). Although, the five
Asian countries used different approaches to attract foreign invest-
ment, all of them to some extent depended on foreign capital for their
development. Relatively, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan are
less dependent on foreign investment {Tan, 1992). However, in Sin-
gapore, the dependence on foreign capital is very high. In 1983,
about 92 percent of Singapore's external borrowing was derived from
foreign investment compared to only 6 percent in Korea (Kim, 1990).
Governments in Asia use various interventionist mechanisms to
increase savings and attract foreign investment. Singapore imposes
mandatory insurance fund contributions as a form of forced savings
for its development programs, including the building of housing flats
for its population and developing industrial sites for its industrial-
ization programs. The Singapore government is also a major actor in
the financial sector. The two government-linked banks—Post Office
Saving Bank and Development Bank of Singapore capture a large
share of the national deposits and are a major investor in govern-
ment bonds. To encourage savings, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
maintain stringent control on loan-rates for consumer items and im-
pose high tax on luxury consumption. The successful Asian countries
are able to institute sound macro-economic policies to avoid inflation
and volatility in real interest rates. These policies help promote con-
fidence among private savers and foreign investors in the Asian
economies.
Competitive and Comparative Advantages
and Economic Performance
Our integrative framework in Figure 2 shows that the immediate
precursors to economic performance are competitive and compara-
tive advantages. The notion of competitive advantage is derived from
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the strategic management literature. Its relevance to economic suc-
cess is well discussed in Porter's (1992) voluminious book. The Com-
petitive Advantage of Nations. The concept of comparative advantage
is based on conventional economic analysis. In essence, the principle
of comparative advantage is about efficient allocation of resources
among industries within a country.
Comparative Versus Competitive Advantages. Conceptually,
comparative advantages tend to be more dependent on factor en-
dowment whereas competitive advantages tend to be more amenable
to strategic choices. Comparative advantage tends to be a static con-
cept whereas competitive advantage is more dynamic. Warr (1994)
suggests that the concept of comparable advantages is more applic-
able to country-level analysis, whereas the competitive advantages
is more suitable for firm-level analysis. We believe that in reality the
two concepts can overlap and even overlap substantially. For exam-
ple, a government can improve the comparative advantage of its
country by creating a conducive environment to support the com-
petitiveness of both private-owned and government-owned firms
within the country.
In our analysis of Asian successes, we believe that both compara-
tive and competitive advantages are important. We agree with Warr
(1994) that the two concepts "should be properly viewed as comple-
ments to one another and should not be seen as competitors for the
minds of policy-makers" (13). Porter (1990) cites a good example of
how South Korea improved the competitive advantages of its ship-
building firms through upgrading and capital investment. Likewise,
Grabowski (1994) notes that the governments of Japan, Taiwan, and
South Korea have indirectly influenced the comparative advantages
of their countries by manipulating the allocation of financial re-
sources among industries. He notes that they have "either directly
controlled the banking system via public ownership or indirectly
through government influence" (414).
Economic Performance. The dotted lines connecting economic per-
formance to strategic choices and factor endowment suggests that
the growth process is cyclical and operates on the system concept.
The country's ability to foster competitive advantages and harness
its comparative advantages will positively affect its economic per-
formance which in turn will affect its future strategic choices and its
stock of factor endowment. Thus, our framework in Figure 2 depicts
an economic system which reinforces itself eitber as a virtuous cycle
of growth or as a vicious cycle of poverty.
One reason why the five Asian countries were so successful is that
they are quick to respond to the feedback of their strategies. Except
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for Hong Kong, the other Asian countries had adopted the import-
substitution strategy at the early stage of their development. How-
ever, they quickly switched to export-oriented strategy once they
sensed that the import substitution strategy was not generating
enough income for the country (Page, 1994). Singapore's experience
is a good example of how a country could make the necessary ad-
justments in its strategies in order to achieve its growth objective.
When Singapore first commenced on its industrialization program,
it adopted the import substitution approach. However, after the
separation with Malaysia in 1965, it was not feasible to continue the
strategy due to its small domestic market. Thus, it quickly switched
its approach to export orientation and focused on labour-intensive in-
dustries to create employement. However, in the 1970s, when Sin-
gapore achieved full employment, it directed its effort to promoting
more capital-intensive projects. By early 1980s, Singapore embarked
on a wage increase program to induce investors and entrepreneurs
to upgrade to high-tech industries. However, by the mid-1980s, there
were indications that the program was not working to its desired ef-
fect. The Singapore government then quickly froze the wages of its
labour force to correct the situation (Tan, 1992). By the late 1980s
and early 1990s, Singapore realized that to sustain the long term
competitiveness vis-a-vis the world, it has to reduce its direct inter-
vention in the market. Since then, it has started on its privatization
program beginning with the privatization of Singapore Telecommu-
nications.
Likewise, Japan's MITI also adapted its role to conform to market
demands. During the post-war period, MITI played an active role as
initator, agent and implementor of Japan's industrial policies. How-
ever, in the 1980s, MITI switch its role to being a helper to prob-
lematic industries (Smith, 1995). In the 1970s, South Korea directly
intervened in its economy through its trade and financial policies to
promote its heavy and chemical industries. However, this strategic
choice proved fatal as many firms were indebted. By the 1980s,
South Korea abandoned the direct intervention strategy and relied
more on the private sector to make decisions (Smith, 1995; Tan,
1992).
CONCLUSION
We have traced the success stories of the Five Asian countries and
captured the essence of their success in our integrative framework.
Theoretically, the foundation of our framework is derived from di-
verse school of thoughts ranging from the the neo-classical ortholo-
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gy to the interventist, and from the technological to cultural imper-
ative. We argue that the economic development of a country is a com-
plex phenomenon and hence cannot be attributed to any single-cause
explanations or major school of thoughts. One major contribution of
the paper lies in our synthesis of the previous scholarly works by re-
searchers of various disciplines. It provides a multi-cause explana-
tion of the Asian success stories.
At the applied level, we believe that we can derive some practical
lessons from the Asian success story, however, we want to caution
that there is no such thing as a copy-cat approach in economic de-
velopment. Indeed, economic development is a tedious and complex
process. Every country is inherently different in terms of factor en-
dowment, resource base, comparative and competitive advantages.
There are also certain non-economic factors that make repeating the
Asian success experiences difficult. For example, nowadays it will be
harder for developing countries to rely on export-oriented strategies
to stimulate economic growth when the world trading environment
is not as conducive as in the 1950s and 1960s. Also, Smith (1995)
feels that the interventionist policies as practiced by the Asian coun-
tries may not be replicable "given a less receptive trading environ-
ment for export subsidies, more open capital markets, and freer la-
bor markets" (32). In view of the contingencies and complexities
involved, policy-makers need a framework to help them diagnose
their economies in order to devise a contextually relevant strategy
for their countries' situation. Our framework will serve that purpose.
As reflected in our framework, many factors are involved in the
development of a country, and these factors are interrelated in a
complex systems. At the practical level, this means that there is no
single-approach to remedy poor economic performance. Policy-mak-
ers must know how to use the total-systems approach to solving eco-
nomic problems. In other words, policy-makers must know how to
analyse their economies as complex systems. In formulating their
growth strategies, policy-makers must consider the complex interre-
lations of various components of their economic systems. This im-
plies that their strategies should be integrated and coherent since
intervention at one component of the economy will have impact on
the others. For example, investment on technology must be sup-
ported by corresponding investment on education and training.
Our framework depicts economies as dynamic and not static sys-
tems. A country's competitive and comparative advantages can
change over time either due to conscious strategic choices or uncon-
trollable external events. For example, traditionally Singapore has
a comparative advantage in entrepot trade. However, by the early
1960s, the Singapore government realized that it could not depend
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on entrepot trade for its survival and growth. Thus, it embarked on
its industrialization program. Now, tbree decades later, Singapore's
competitive and comparative advantages are not found in entrepot
trade, but in other economic activities, such as manufacturing, bank-
ing, and tourism. The implication is that policy-makers must con-
stantly monitor the economic performance of the country. They must
know how to discern trends in the environment and take proactive
measures to capitalize on the opportunities and avoid the threats of
the environment. We have already mentioned how the Asian coun-
tries had capitalised on the certain technological breakthroughs in
the 1960s to develop their economies. The environment now is more
complex and turbulent. The challenge is for the pohcy-makers to
make sense of this chaos and formulate appropriate strategies in re-
sponse to them.
International business managers can also use our integrative
framework as a diagnostic tool to analyze the Asian countries and
decide how their firms can harness the competitive and comparative
advantages of the various Asian countries. Since the Five Asian
countries have dissimilar competitive and comparative advantages
among themselves, it will be more lucrative for multinational corpo-
rations to invest in different countries to supply components for the
final products. This arrangement will offer multi-national corpora-
tions opportunities to take advantages of different comparative and
competitive advantages of different countries. It will also help them
avoid import barriers since only intermediate products are involved.
Lee (1990) gave an example of how a personal computer manufac-
turer multi-national corporation set up a regional network of low
cost subsidiaries and joint-ventures in seven Asian countries to sup-
ply components for the final products.
Multinational firms can be powerful enough to exert an impact on
the economic environment of their host countries. This means that
international business managers need not be passive agents sub-
jecting themselves to the limitations of their host countries. They
should try to be active agents making effort to shape the competitive-
ness of their host countries. In other words, they can take proactive
actions to initiate programs that help their host countries develop.
For example, multinational corporations can support vocational
training to help develop the human capital for their host countries.
They can also invest in endogenous R&D to come out with innova-
tive products that are closer to the Asian consumers' needs.
In response to the multinational corporations' interests in the re-
gion, the Asian governments have become more aggressive in their
efforts to attract regional headquarters in their countries. Hong
Kong and Singapore have already become the Asian hubs for re-
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gional headquarters and are among the top ten cities to do business
(Saporito, 1994). Both countries offers many advantages as the pre-
ferred locations for regional headquarters. They have good infra-
structures, availability of skilled workers, pro-business government,
and, access to the China market. However, the ever spiraling cost of
doing business and the potential personnel confiicts between Hong
Kong and mainland Chinese employees are factors that weigh
against Hong Kong's appeal as the preferred site for regional head-
quarters. Other Asian cities aspiring to pattern after Hong Kong's
and Singapore's success include Shanghai and Taiwan. The govern-
ments are working hard to improve their infi*astructures, streamline
their administrative procedures and provide various tax incentives
to attract multinational firms to set their headquarters in their
cities.
Multinational corporations seeking to enhance their presence in
the fast-developing Asian countries should consider setting head-
quarters in the region if they have not done so. Establishing region-
al headquarters in Asia provides distinct competitive advantages in
the Asian market vis-a-vis those firms that are headquartered in
non-Asian countries such as US and Europe. For example, Chrysler
recently set up its Southeast Asian Regional Headquarters in Sin-
gapore (PR Newswlre, 1996). It wants to get closer to the market and
its consumers so that it can respond quickly to any changes in the
market conditions. It believes that by being close to the market, it
will be able to design models with styling, performance levels, and
safety features that match the expectations of its Asian customers.
In addition to ancedotal evidences from news report and press re-
leases, there are empirical studies that confirm the wisdom of es-
tablishing regional headquarters in Asia. For example, a recent
study indicate that regional headquarters in Asia have important
roles to perform. Broadly the roles could be classified as entrepre-
neurial and integrative roles (Lasserre 1996). Entrepreneurial roles
include scouting for business opportunities, stimulating strategic
planning through analysing changes in the regional environment
and incorporating these analyses into business strategies, and, sig-
nalling commitment to local authorities and to internal stakeholders
(e.g., product division). The integration roles include coordinating
implementation of policies and ensuring businesses exploit synergies
across the region, and pooling resources.
REFERENCES
Amsden, A.H. (1979) "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and
a Challenge to Dependency Theory, Modern China, 5 (3), 341-380.
182 WEE AND TAN
Amsden, A.H. (1989) Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrial-
ization, New York: Oxford University Press.
Amsden, A.H. (1994) "Why isn't the Whole World Experimenting with the
East Asian Model to Develop? Review of the East Asian Miracle," World
Development, 22 (4), 627-633.
Arndt, H.W. (1985) "The Origins of Structuralism," World Development, 13,
February, 151-159.
Beijing Review (1996) "China: Economic growth—the Asian experience,"
August 5.
Chen, E.K.Y. (1985) "The Newly Industrializing Countries in Asia: Growth
Experience and Prospects," in R.A. Scalapino, S. Sato, and J. Wanandi
(Eds.), Asian Economic Development—Present and Future, Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press.
Dore, R. (1987) Taking Japan Seriously: a Confusian Perspective on the
Leading Economic Issues, London: The Athlone Press.
Goh, K.S. (1993) "What Causes Fast Economic Growth," Industry of Free
China, LXXX (6), December, 37-50.
Gold, T. (1986) State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle, Armonk, NY; M.E.
Sharpe.
Grabowski, R. (1994) The Successful Development State: Where Does it
Come From, World Development, 22 (3), 413^22.
Griffith, W.H. (1987) "Can CARICOM Countries Replicate the Singapore
Experience?" Journal of Development Studies, 24 (1), October, 60-82.
Han, S.S. (1988) "Of Economic Success and Confusianism," Far East Eco-
nomic Review, 126, December 20, 104-106.
Hopkinson, N. (1993) "Economic Growth in the Dynamic Asia-Pacific Re-
gion," Wilton Park Paper 73, London:HMSO.
Ho, Y.P. and Lin T.B. (1991) "Structural Adjustment in a Free-Trade, Free
Market Economy," in H. Patrick (Ed.), Pacific Basin Industries in Dis-
tress: Structural Adjustment and Trade Policy in the Nine Industrialized
Economies, New York: Columbia University Press.
Huges, H. (1995) "Why Have East Asian Countries Led Economic Develop-
ment?" The Economic Record, 71 (212), March, 88-104.
Johnson, C. (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Johnson, C. (1986) "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The
Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan,"
in RA. Scalapino (Ed.), Asian Economic Development, University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley.
Kaplinsky, R. (1984) "The International Context for IndustriaHzation in the
Coming Decade." Journal of Developing Studies, 1 (21), October, 75-96.
Kim, L. (1990) "Korea: The Acquisition of Technology." In H. Soesastro and
M. Pangestu (Eds.), Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy.
Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Kraemer, K.L. & Dedrick, J. (1994) "Payoffs from Investment in Informa-
tion Technology: Lessons from Asia-Pacific Region," 22 (12), 1921-1931.
Krugman, P. (1994) "The myth of Asia's miracle." Foreign Affairs, Novem-
ber/December, 62-78.
THE ASIAN SUCCESS STORY 183
Kwon, J. (1994) "The East Asia Challenge to Neoclassical Orthodoxy." World
Development, 22 (4), 635-644.
Lall, S. (1994a) "The East Asian Miracle: Does the Bell Toll for Industrial
Strategy?" World Development 22, (4), 645-654.
Lall, S. (1994b) "Industry Policy: The Role of Government in Promoting In-
dustrial and Technological Development." UNCTAD Review, 1994, UNC-
TAD, Geneva.
Lasserre, P. (1996) "Regional Headquarters: The Spearhead for Asia Pacif-
ic Markets." Long Range Planning, 29 (1), 30-37.
Lee, K.Y. (1990) "Asia-Pacific Region in the New Geopolitical Context."
Keynote address by Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the Informal
Gathering of World Economic Leaders 1990 held at the Congress House
in Davos, Switzerland, on February 4, 1990.
Lee, K.Y. (1996) "How Asia Become Dynamo of World Economies." A lecture
conducted by the Senior Minister on 17 June 1996, at the Ludwig-Maxi-
milians University in Munich, Germany. Published in Straits Times, June
18, 26.
Lee, S.A. (1973) Industrialisation in Singapore (Melbourne: Longman
Cheshire).
Lim, L.Y.C. (1983) "Singapore's Success: The Myth of Free Market Econo-
my." Asian Survey, 23 (6), June, 752-64.
Lim, D. (1991) "Education and Skills Training for Industrial Transition:
Lessons from the Newly Industrializing Economies." Paper presented at
the seminar "Managing Industrial Transition: Policies for the 1990s," or-
ganised by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia)
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, September 2-3, 1991.
Lim, D. (1994) "Explaining the Growth Performance of Asian Developing
Economies." Economic Development and Cultural Change, 829-844.
McClelland, D.C. (1961) The Achieving Society. New Jersey: Van Nostrand.
Migdal, J. (1986) "Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Rela-
tions and State Capabilities in the Third World." Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press.
Onis, Z. (1995) "The Limits of Neoliberalism: Toward a Reformulation of De-
velopment Theory." Journal of Economic Issues, 29 (1), 97-119.
Pack, H. (1993) "Industrial Trade Policeies in the High-Performing Asian
Economies." Background paper for The East Asian Miracle, Washington
DC: World Bank, Policy Research Department.
Pack, H. and Page, J.M. (1993) "Accumulation, Exports and Growth in the
High-Performing Asian Economies." Background paper for the The East
Asian Miracle. Washington DC, World Bank, Policy Research Department.
Page, J.M. and Petri, P.A. (1993) "Productivity Change and Strategic
Growth Policy in the Asian Miracle." Backgroimd paper for The East
Asian Miracle. Washington DC, World Bank, Policy Research Depart-
ment.
Page, J.M. (1994) "The East Asian Miracle: An Introduction." World Devel-
opment, 22 (4), 615-625.
Patel, S.J. (1994) "East Asia's Spectacular Development: Its Lessons for
Others." Asia-Pacific Development Journal, 1 (1), 27-46.
184 WEE AND TAN
Perkins, D.H. (1994) "There Are at Least Three Models of East Asian De-
velopment." World Development, 22 (4), 655-661.
Porter, M. (1990) "The Competitive Advantages of Nations," New York: Free
Press.
PR Newswire (September 19, 1996) "Chrysler Corporation Assumes Distri-
bution in Korea; Appoints President."
Riedel, J.R. (1988) "Economic Development in East Asia: Doing What
Comes Naturally?," in H. Huges (Ed.), Achieving Industralisation in East
Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1-38.
Saporito, B. (1994) "The World's Best Cities for Business." Fortune, No-
vember 14, 1994.
Sarker, P.C. and Gaur, A.P. (1994) "Socio-Economic and Human Develop-
ment in South and East Asian Countries." Asia-Pacific Development
Journal.
Schultz, T.W (1960) "Capital Formation by Education." Journal of Political
Economy, November/December, 60-72.
Schultz, T.W. (1961) "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analy-
sis." American Economic Review, 51 (1), March, 1-17.
Smith, H. (1995) "Industry Policy in East Asia." Asia-Pocr/ic Economic Lit-
erature, 9 (1), May, 17-39.
South China Morning Post (1994) "Proton Looks to the Road Ahead." Au-
gust 25, 1994.
Straits Times (1996) "East Asian Growth Depends on its Keeping Culture
of Hard Work: SM." June 18 1996, 3.
Tai, H.C. (1989) "The Oriental Alternative: A Hypothesis on East Asian Cul-
ture and Economy." Issues and Studies, 25 (3), March, 10-36.
Tan, G. (1992) "The Newly Industrializing Countries of Asia." Singapore:
Time Academic Press.
Tan, G. (1996) "ASEAN Economic Development and Co-Operation." Singa-
pore: Time Academic Press.
Wade, R. (1990) "Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of
Government in East Asian Industrialisation." Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
Warr, P. (1994) "Comparative and Competitive Advantage." Asian-Pacific
Economic Literature, 8 (2), 1-14.
Weber, M. (1958) "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism." New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
World Bank, (1991) "World Development Reports." New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
World Bank, (1993) "The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public
Policy." Policy Research Report, Washington DC: The World Bank.
Woronoff, J. (1986) Asia's "Miracle" Economies. New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc.
Wu, YL. (1987) "Models of Development: A Comparative Study of Econom-
ic Growth in South Korea and Taiwan—A Review." Weltwirtschaftliches,
Archiv, 123, 377-380.
